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Does Time Burden Affect Collective Forest Management? Analyzing the Gendered 
Effects of Work and Participation in Northwestern India 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper reports the results of a statistical investigation of the relationship 
between labor time expended in rural livelihoods, social structure, and community forest 
management. The object is to understand the impact of labor constraints to collective 
action. There are three main results. First, increasing time burden of work has a negative 
impact on collective forest management. Second, the gendered nature of work imposes a 
high burden on women and hence impedes their ability to participate in collective 
management even if incentives exist. In addition, lower access to social infrastructure 
further increases work burdens and decreases ability to participate. Finally, high levels of 
wealth lead to lower individual participation but this not because of high opportunity of 
time worked.   
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1. Introduction 
Community management of forests and other natural resources has been the center of 
important public policy, empirical, and theoretical debates. Two primary questions have 
been the focus of these discussions. While one line of investigation pertains to the 
relationship between the rural livelihoods and forests, a second line of investigation aims 
to understand the factors leading to participation in collective action and co-management 
programs. These two questions are interdependent since a greater understanding of the 
well-being of resource users and the social relations within communities promotes an 
understanding of variations in the outcomes of collective management. 
 A number of studies have approached these two questions theoretically (e.g. 
Agarwal, 2000, 2001; Agrawal, 2001; Baland and Platteau, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2003; 
Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov, 2007; Dayton-Johnson, 2000; Dayton-Johnson and 
Bardhan, 2002; Johnson, 2004; Ostrom, 1990) and empirically (e.g. Adhikari, 2005; 
Adhikari, Falco and Lovett, 2004; Agrawal and Chhattre, 2006; Baland et al., 2007; 
Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2007; Heltberg, 2001; Jodha, 1986; Naidu, 2009). Despite 
this rich literature, there is a paucity of attention devoted to the issues of time use and its 
role in collective management. The limited number of studies incorporating time use in 
their analyses focus on the questions of forest extraction and degradation (Adhikari, 
2005; Adhikari, Falco and Lovett, 2004; Baland et al., 2007; Cooke, 1998; Kumar and 
Hotchkiss, 1988) or engage in a valuation exercise by attempting to calculate the 
opportunity cost of forest extraction (e.g. WRI, 2005). Although there have been indirect 
references to time use and its effect on collective management (Baland and Platteau, 
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2007; Naidu, 2009), this question has not been analyzed thoroughly. Moreover, the 
parameters of the debate do not adequately address the relationship between the gendered 
character of time use, access to resources, and the social structure of the community. This 
fact represents a limitation in the literature insofar as time use is a significant factor 
affecting collective resource management, especially in economies with labor-intensive 
production processes. 
 Participation in collective management typically occurs in the form of labor 
contributions, monetary contributions, or both. Monetary contributions may be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for successful collective resource management 
since some form of labor time is required to maintain, manage, and protect resources; 
design institutional rules; and implement politico-institutional decisions. In economies 
with well-functioning labor markets, monetary contributions may substitute for labor. But 
in economies with thin labor markets, the inability of individuals to contribute labor time 
can induce poor collective management outcomes even if incentives are present. 
Similarly, in communities with low per capita income or low capital endowments, labor 
may be substituted for monetary contributions in view of its relative abundance. From the 
perspective of an individual, time is a scarce resource (see Ilahi, 2000) and contributions 
of time to collective management are constrained by the time required to engage in social 
reproduction1 in addition to market and non-market production, which are determined by 
inter-household and intra-household variables.  
                                                        
1 Social reproduction encompasses biological reproduction, reproduction of the labor force and 
fulfilling provisioning and caring needs (Bakker, 2003). Labor for social reproduction is generally 
gendered. 
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 This article has two key objectives. First, this article reports the findings of a 
statistical analysis of the effect of the time burden of work on participation in community 
forestry utilizing data obtained from field work in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. 
However, it is also important to understand the determinants of variability in time 
burdens. The second objective is therefore to investigate the effect of social structure on 
participation in addition to the time burden of work. This two-pronged approach is 
adopted to clarify the relationship between social structures, time burden of work, and 
individual participation in collective forest management. The results suggest that gender, 
wealth, caste, and access to public infrastructure and forests have direct effects on 
participation in collective management, but gender also has an indirect negative effect on 
participation because women typically have high work burdens. Further, higher wealth is 
associated with lower participation but this result may not be attributed to time deficiency 
since higher wealth also lower work burdens. Finally, decreased access to public 
infrastructure and forests increases work burden and thus indirectly reduces ability of 
individuals to participate in collective management. Accordingly, the rest of the paper 
proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the sampling method and provide 
details about the various variables of interest. In section three, I present and interpret the 
regression results. Section four concludes.  
 
2. Sampling and Data   
 The study area is located in Mandi district within the Indian state of Himachal 
Pradesh. Himachal Pradesh is situated within the western Himalayan region and is quite 
important from an ecological perspective.  The population of Mandi district is primarily 
  6 
rural and a significant percent of the population engaged in agriculture (see Table 1). Of 
the ten development blocks in Mandi district, twelve villages from a particular 
development block were purposively chosen, such that six villages were situated within a 
specific wildlife sanctuary and six outside although within close proximity to the 
sanctuary. A total of 209 households were selected based on stratified random sampling 
to reflect the prevailing caste distribution. Respondents were randomly selected from 
these households such that the sample consisted of an equal number of males and females 
above the age of 18 years. Data on the socioeconomic status of the household; agrarian, 
pastoral and forest practices; and time use were collected from two rounds of structured 
interviews in 2008. Subsequently, follow-up group interviews were conducted in each 
village. Below I discuss the variables analyzed in the regression models.  
Table 1: Characteristics of Mandi district  
Percentage of rural population to total 
population (2001) 
93.23 percent  
Population density (2001) 228 persons per square kilometer 
Sex ratio (2001)  1,012 females per 1,000 males 
Net irrigated area as percent of net sown 
area (2005-2006) 
16.07 percent 
Forests as percent of total geographical 
area (2005-2006) 
15.93 percent  
Net sown area as percent of total 
geographical area (2005-2006)  
15.86 percent 
Source: GoI (2001), GoHP (2011)  
 
(a) Participation in Forest Management 
Forests in India are nationalized and forest policies tend to adopt a ‘top-down’ 
scientific management approach that is often to the detriment of the forests and its 
inhabitants. Since the 1980s, however, the Indian state has experimented with the idea of 
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incorporating forest dwellers in their management plans. These efforts became quite 
prominent beginning in the 1990s when the state decided to implement community 
forestry under the aegis of joint forest management (JFM). The central principle of JFM 
is that forests ought to be managed jointly by local forest communities and the Forest 
Department2. Himachal Pradesh adopted the principles of JFM in 1993 and has since 
adopted multiple related schemes (see Morrison, 2001 and Vasan, 2003 for a detailed 
discussion). 
Participation in community forestry entails contributing labor time to meetings 
concerning forest management (meetings), engaging in planting trees and fencing off 
parts of forests (maintenance), and monitoring use of forests within the community 
(monitoring), in addition to protecting forests from outsiders and wildfires (protection). 
These are dichotomous variables that take the value “1” if respondents contribute to the 
activities, and “0” if they do not3 (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). These variables 
are analyzed as surrogates for participation in community forest management in the 
context of a statistical analysis. All villages selected for this study had community 
forestry institutions at the time of data collection. It must also be borne in mind that these 
                                                        
2 While there are many criticisms of JFM (Sarin, 2001; Sarin et al., 2003; Sundar, 2000; Sundar, 
Jeffrey and Thin, 2001), this policy at least acknowledged the importance of local forest dwellers 
in public discourse and the results have been positive in certain cases. Also note that the 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights), was 
passed in 2006 in order to transfer legal rights of forest management to local communities. 
However, the provisions of the Act have not yet been implemented. 33 Time and monetary restrictions did not permit gathering data on the amount time contributed in 
these activities in a year. Further, in the case of monitoring and protection activities, it would 
have been hard to calculate time spent because it requires constant vigilance on the part of 
villagers.  
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labor contributions are unremunerated and hence may be considered “voluntary”4. Since 
labor markets are thin in Mandi, labor time is not freely traded, nor can these labor 
contributions be substituted by monetary contributions. Furthermore, none of the 
respondents contributed monies to community management; the contribution of labor 
time was the only form of participation. 
 
(b) Time Use 
Time is a vital resource and time distribution in work and other activities is of 
interest because it influences ability and incentive to participate in collective management 
and forest conservation (Agarwal, 2000, 2007). Being a scarce resource, time available 
for collective management could compete with household and market production 
essential for subsistence and household well-being. While it is true that rural households, 
and especially women are very dependent on forests (Negi, Rana and Sharma, 1997 cited 
in GoHP, 2002) and have a strong incentive to contribute to collective forest 
management, time pressure caused by diverse productive and reproductive roles, in 
conjunction with other ecological, social and cultural factors could reduce a respondent’s 
ability to contribute. In particular, the gendered nature of time worked is worthy of 
attention because allocation of labor time is typically governed by gender norms and 
patterns of socialization (Floro, 1995a); this could (at least partly) explain why 
participation in collective management varies by gender and other socioeconomic factors. 
 In order to proceed, it is necessary to compute the time burden of work. However, 
it is insufficient to define the burden of work as the number of hours worked by a forest                                                         
4 The underlying assumption is that there is no compulsion to cooperate or participate. This 
assumption does not necessarily obtain.  
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user. A difficulty emerges insofar as a high work burden induces men and women to not 
only stretch the working day and reduce leisure time but also exert more effort per unit of 
time by engaging in overlapping activities (Floro, 1995a; Floro and Pichetpongsa, 2010). 
Ignoring overlapping work has been acknowledged to be a serious methodological flaw 
in time-use estimation (Beneria, 1992; Juster and Stafford, 1991; United Nations, 1988, 
1990; Floro, 1995a), since women work longer hours in more than one task, i.e., in 
overlapping or simultaneous tasks (Floro and Pichetpongsa, 2010).  Thus, special 
attention is paid to simultaneous activities in order to differentiate primary and secondary 
activities in this paper5.  
Respondents were requested to chronologically recall their activities beginning at 
four o’clock on the previous morning to four o’clock on the day of the interview (see 
Esquivel et al., 2008; Pichetpongsa, 2004 for a review of time use methods). The subjects 
described these activities in their own words and provided the approximate duration of 
these activities. In addition to classifying overlapping work activities as primary or 
secondary, work was categorized as (a) household work (e.g. cooking, cleaning, and 
mending or producing clothes); (b) care work (e.g. minding the children and caring for 
the elderly); (c) subsistence and petty commodity production (e.g. grazing and caring for 
cattle, extraction and processing of forest goods, and tasks related to agricultural 
production); (d) casual and non-casual wage work; and (e) market activities such as 
buying and selling commodities. The summations of the total time expended in all 
primary activities were computed. Recognizing that multi-tasking may increase the net 
time available but reduce the quality of work or create production bottlenecks, correction                                                         
5 With respect to overlapping work, the respondent decided the classification of work as a 
primary (or main) activity and secondary (or additional) activity.  
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factors for secondary activities were calculated for all categories of work. Specifically, 
time expended in secondary activities were assigned weights of 0.5 (Pichetpongsa, 2004; 
Pichetpongsa and Floro, 2007). In this data set, the average work burden was 
approximately 12 hours per day (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Relevant Variables 
Variable 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Total household land (acres) 1.85 2.02 0 22.4  
Age of respondent (years) 42.41 9.8 21 71 
Proportion of dependents to 
total household size 
0.15 0.19 0 0.67 
Household size 5.18 2.02 1 12 
Total dependents 0.88 1.18 0 6 
Total time worked  
(minutes per day) 
724.53 297.82 0 1,612.5 
Quantity of biomass (kilograms 
by household in a season) 
886.47 843.03 0 4,200 
Total animals 9.35 24.08 0 203 
Distance to childcare center 
(minutes) 
13.79 12.25 0 60 
Distance to a water source 
(minutes) 
3.12 2.09 0 15 
     
Variable Proportion 
Respondents living within a sanctuary 0.535 
Respondents participating in meetings 0.574 
Respondents participating in protection 0.568 
Respondents participating in monitoring 0.57 
Respondents participating in management 0.446 
Female-headed households 0.185 
Female respondents  0.53 
Upper caste respondents  0.81 
Respondents with intense work days 0.42  
 
 
In statistical terms, the argument adduced in this section implies the existence of a 
negative correlation between work burden and participation in collective management, 
and that work itself might be influenced by gender, wealth and other factors. Thus, the 
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social phenomena of time burden and participation in community forestry are analyzed in 
structural rather than reduced form; participation in collective forest management is 
regressed on time burden of work and a vector of explanatory factors while time burden 
is regressed on a vector of regressors. 
 
(c) Wealth and Gender Characteristics 
 The economy of the field site is dependent on agro-pastoral activities and 
therefore land and livestock are important assets and indicators of wealth6.  In India, land 
especially indicates creditworthiness of the household and its social status, while 
providing a form of insurance against economic shocks (Agarwal, 1994; Bardhan, 2005; 
Mearns, 1999). Due to the mountainous terrain, however, landholdings tend to be small 
and thus the average landholding is 1.85 acres. On average, moreover, each household 
owns nine animals (see Table 2). One might expect a high correlation between caste, 
landholdings and livestock holdings, but the correlation is weak in this data set. 
Correlation between caste and landholdings is 0.222; the correlation between caste and 
quantity of livestock is 0.12; and correlation between private landholdings and livestock 
holdings is 0.11. The low correlation coefficients suggest that these variables can be 
treated separately in the regression analysis. All three variables appear as explanatory                                                         
6 Land markets are relatively thin and is mostly inherited. This inheritance, however, is governed 
by gender norms and women typically do not inherit land. Despite changes in the Hindu 
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which attempts to correct gender inequities with respect to 
the division of family property, women in Mandi district typically do not have titles to land. They 
have some claim to benefits derived from land owned by members of the household though 
change in marital status, such as widowhood and estrangement, may diminish this claim (see 
Agarwal, 1994; Ruwanpura, 2007). It should be noted that men, even if they are head of 
households, also may not possess titles to their land. Land may often be registered in the names of 
deceased family members. Accordingly, land is viewed as a household asset to which all 
household members have some claim. The issue of unequal claims is recognized but not dealt 
with in this paper.  
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variables in the regression equations for participation and time burden of work. Higher 
wealth is expected to increase the incentive to participate but only if the forest commons 
are a complementary input into private production (Baland and Platteau, 1996, 1999). 
However, if private inputs can be substituted for those available from forests, there is a 
lower incentive to participate. Further, wealthy individuals have higher access to 
resources, including time. All else constant, this should increase their ability to 
contribute. On the other hand, if wealthy individuals face a time deficit due to pressing 
demands on their time, they may be unable to contribute to collective management.  
Himachal Pradesh, and Mandi district particularly, has a high sex ratio 
(proportion of females to males)7 and a high female literacy rate compared to the national 
average (see GoHP, 2002). Gender norms and other forms of socialization nevertheless 
dictate that household productive and reproductive work, especially unremunerated work, 
is largely, though not solely, carried out by women (Negi, Rana and Sharma, 1997 cited 
in GoHP, 2002). Fifty-seven percent of the sampled respondents are females thus 
allowing us to compare the work burden of men and women in the region as well as their 
participation in collective forest management.  
 
(d) Access to Social Infrastructure and the Forest Commons 
Access to social infrastructure may be important in reducing the work burden (see 
Lawson, 2007). As the provision of public goods increases, the amount of work is 
expected to decrease while the converse holds if there is poor provision of public goods. 
To capture this idea, two variables, water_dist, and childcare_dist, are included in the                                                         
7 Though child sex ratio in the state has been declining and this is an issue of concern (Premi, 
2001).  
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regression analysis. These variables refer to the distance from place of residence to the 
nearest water source and childcare facility respectively8. Mean time required to travel to 
the nearest water source is 3.12 minutes and to the nearest childcare facility is 13.79 
minutes.  
While state policies have generally been restrictive of forest access, due to 
historical factors, however, most rural households in Himachal Pradesh retain de jure 
rights for bonafide personal consumption of forest products (Chhatre, 2003). This 
provides an incentive to participate in collective management. Thus, the variable, 
biomass, which measures the quantity of biomass (excluding firewood and fodder) that is 
collected by the respondent’s household over six months is included as an explanatory 
variable in the participation regressions.  
The degree of control over forest management is likely to be less within a wildlife 
sanctuary on account of bureaucratic involvement of the Forest Department and the 
existence of a thriving illegal timber trade. Residents of the sanctuary are likely to treat 
their forests as an open access resource rather than a collective good (see Guha, 1990; 
Gadgil and Guha, 1995). In order to statistically capture this effect, access to forests is 
proxied by the inclusion of the dummy variable, sanctuary, which takes the value unity if 
the respondent resides within the sanctuary. This variable is included as an explanatory                                                         
8 Under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) policy, childcare centers 
(aanganwadis) were established to provide nonformal preschool education, supplementary 
feeding for children, pregnant and nursing mothers, and primary healthcare services. There were 
72 projects with 7,354 aanganwadi centers in the state (Government of India, 2005).  
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variable for collective forest management; this variable is expected to have a negative 
impact on participation in community forestry. Further, in a rural economy such as in 
Mandi district with its relatively high forest dependence, a reduction in access to forests, 
as is the case in villages located within the wildlife sanctuary is likely to higher increase 
time burden of work.  
 
3. Econometric Results  
Table 3 presents a brief explanation of the dependent and explanatory variables. 
Two sets of regressions are presented. The first set presented in Table 4 regresses the four 
alternative indicators of participation on time burden and other explanatory variables. 
Since the indicators of participation are binary variables, they are analyzed in the context 
of a probit model. Table 5 shows the results obtained for the time burden regression 
equation. Time burden of work is a continuous variable and hence Table 5 presents 
coefficients of an ordinary least squares regression. Making explicit the relationship 
between labor time expended in rural livelihoods, social structure and community 
management will help identify the importance of labor constraints to participation in 
community forestry. In the following sub-section, I briefly discuss the effect of time 
burden of work on participation in community forestry. In the remaining sub-sections I 
explain the effects of various explanatory variables on participation as well as time 
burden of work, disaggregated by gender, wealth, access to social infrastructure and the 
forest commons, and other effects. In doing so, I clarify the direct and indirect effects of 
these explanatory variables on participation.  
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Table 3: Description of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description  
Participation indicators – Dependent variable  
meetings Binary variable where 1 indicates if respondent attends forest 
related meetings  
maintenance Binary variable where 1 indicates if respondent participates in 
forest maintenance 
monitoring Binary variable where 1 indicates if respondent participates in 
monitoring of forest rules 
protection Binary variable where 1 indicates if respondent participates in 
forest protection 
Time burden of work – Dependent variable  
time_burden Indicates the total time worked in household and market 
production, and domestic and care work (reproductive work). 
Standardized around mean and standard error. It is also used as an 
explanatory variable for the participation regressions apart.  
Gender effects  
female_resp Binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent is female 
female_hh Binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent belongs to a 
female headed household 
Access to public infrastructure  
water_dist Total distance from place of residence to nearest water source. 
Standardized around the mean and standard error.  
childcare_dist  Total distance from place of residence to nearest childcare center 
(aanganwadi). Standardized around the mean and standard error. 
Wealth variables 
Land Total landholdings of the respondent’s household. Standardized 
around the mean and standard error. 
livestock Total livestock that belongs to the respondent’s household. 
Standardized around the mean and standard error. 
Forest-related variables 
sanctuary Binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent lives within 
the sanctuary  
biomass  Total biomass extracted by the respondent’s household in six 
months. Standardized around the mean and standard error. 
Other variables 
age_resp Age of the respondent. Standardized around the mean and 
standard error. 
wintensity_dummy  Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the work intensity on the 
day of the interview was above normal.  
Caste Binary variable in which 1 indicates that the respondent is upper 
caste.  
dependents Proportion of dependents in the respondent’s family.  
totmembers Total number of members in the respondent’s household. 
Standardized around the mean and standard error. 
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Table 4: Probit Analysis: Four Alternate Indicators of Participationα 
 
 meetings 
(1) 
maintenance 
(2) 
monitoring 
(3) 
protection 
(4) 
intercept -0.237 
(0.427) 
-0.466 
(0.433) 
-0.479 
(0.445) 
-0.411 
(0.459) 
time_burden -0.321** 
(0.132) 
-0.26** 
(0.127) 
-0.325** 
(0.129) 
-0.205 
(0.129) 
female_resp 0.302 
(0.231) 
0.474* 
(0.245) 
0.293 
(0.235) 
0.116 
(0.235) 
age_resp -0.315*** 
(0.118) 
-0.197 
(0.123) 
-0.303** 
(0.119) 
-0.29** 
(0.117) 
totmembers 0.122  
(0.118) 
0.023 
(0.115) 
0.106 
(0.121) 
0.133 
(0.116) 
caste  0.642** 
(0.311) 
0.764** 
(0.329) 
0.963*** 
(0.299) 
1.01*** 
(0.313) 
land 0.049 
(0.134) 
-0.191* 
(0.108) 
0.073 
(0.145) 
0.077 
(0.143) 
livestock -0.124 
(0.08) 
-0.072 
(0.078) 
-0.153* 
(0.079) 
-0.144* 
(0.08) 
biomass 0.153 
(0.104) 
0.383*** 
(0.109) 
0.217** 
(0.105) 
0.138 
(0.107) 
sanctuary -0.587 
(0.393) 
-0.703* 
(0.395) 
-0.66* 
(0.40) 
-0.701* 
(0.412) 
Log likelihood -102.99 -94.44 -103.68 -104.746  
 
N 204 204 204 204 
 
Area under the 
ROC curve 
0.80 0.84 0.80 0.79 
 
α  robust standard errors in parantheses; ***Significant at 1 percent level; **Significant at 5 percent level; 
*Significant at 10 percent level.  
 
  
 
 
(a) Time Use 
Time spent in work increases individual and household wellbeing, however, 
increasing work intensity may reduce this positive effect and begin to negatively affect 
physical and mental wellbeing (Floro, 1995b; Floro and Pichetpongsa, 2010). In this 
study, the variable time burden of work not only captures the length of the working day 
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(i.e., total hours worked) but also captures the time engaged in overlapping or 
simultaneous work that increases work intensity. The coefficient of this variable has a 
negative sign across all four specifications presented in Table 4 although it is statistically 
significant only in the first three. The sign on this coefficient suggests that as the work 
burden of respondents increased, they were less likely to engage in community forestry 
related activities. The result is of policy significance because it implies that as rural 
livelihoods become more demanding of labor time, individuals are less likely to 
contribute to collective forest management.  
The question that this result poses is: what factors increase an individual’s work 
burden? It has been argued that work burdens imposed on men and women are different 
and may be influenced by social norms; further other socioeconomic factors may 
intensify or mitigate this time burden of work (for example, Agarwal, 2000, 2001, 2007, 
2010; Floro, 1995b; Mencher, 1993). Thus, to appreciate what factors might affect work 
and thereby participation indirectly, time burden of work is subject to further statistical 
analysis. The results of this regression (see Table 5) are discussed below in conjunction 
with the results of the participation regressions.  
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Table 5: OLS Regression Analysis of Total Time Burden of Work 
 
 Total time burden of work 
intercept 0.807*** 
(0.248) 
female_resp 1.00*** 
(0.122) 
age_resp -0.079 
(0.06) 
wintensity_dummy  0.307** 
(0.122) 
female_hh -0.323* 
(0.161) 
caste -0.037 
(0.204) 
land 0.005 
(0.06) 
livestock -0.118* 
(0.063) 
dependents 0.134 
(0.28) 
water_dist -0.065  
(0.066) 
childcare_dist  0.151* 
(0.084) 
sanctuary 0.402* 
(0.199) 
R sq 0.414 
 
N 207 
 
 
(b) Gender Effects 
The coefficient of the variable, female_resp, has a positive and statistically 
significant sign in regression (2) in Table 4. This means that female respondents are 
much more likely to participate in maintaining forests. However, this variable is not 
statistically significant for other participation regressions. Further, the regression in Table 
4 suggests that female respondents bear the higher burden of total work. Of all the 
explanatory variables that time burden of work is regressed on, this variable has the 
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highest marginal effect. There are two related explanations for this pattern of 
participation. 
First, there is a complementary relationship between enhancing the productivity 
of the forest ecosystem and women’s work (see Agarwal, 1997; 2000; 2001; Beard, 
2005) due to the gender division of labor existing in Himachal Pradesh, in which women 
are primarily responsible for reproductive work, and forest extraction for household 
production and consumption (Negi, Rana and Sharma, 1997 cited in GoHP, 2002). 
Combined with lower access to private economic resources and economic opportunities 
(women are less likely to participate in market-related activities) (GoHP, 2002) means 
that the forest common is an important economic resource for women. Thus, there is a 
high incentive for women to participate in community management. However, constraints 
on women’s time could cause them to participate in activities with the highest visible 
positive effects to them (see Mayoux 1993, 1995); one could argue that this is engaging 
in maintenance of forests, including its regeneration and fencing off parts of forests, 
among other aspects. 
Second, women’s participation is not statistically significant across different 
activities, only for maintenance activities. It is possible that the social role of caregivers 
attributed to women allows them to maintain forests but does not offer much space in 
political decision-making, monitoring and enforcing forest violations, or forest protection 
(Agarwal, 2001, 2007; Ilahi, 2000; Mayoux, 1993; Moser, 1993). Thus there exists a 
gender division of labor in community forest management as well where women engage 
in low skilled work with high labor effort such as forest maintenance but do not or are not 
allowed to participate in “men’s work” such as decision-making, rule enforcement, and 
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monitoring. This is consistent with Sarin’s (1995) observation that women in Nepal were 
excluded from monitoring and protection activities until it was found to be beneficial in 
reducing violations by other women without incurring accusations of sexual harassment. 
Thus, the pattern of female participation in community forestry can be explained using a 
combination of social and economic factors. Female respondents are unable to participate 
in community forestry due to heavy work burdens; nevertheless they might be induced or 
inducted into community work without a reduction in other work responsibilities (Moser, 
1993). From the perspective of short-term gains, this bodes well for forest management 
and conservation. However, it may be associated with negative effects on the wellbeing 
of female contributors as well as the long-term viability of such projects (see Floro, 
1995b for a review of studies that discuss the relationship between work intensity and 
individual well-being). A high degree of participation despite heavy time burdens 
increases the inequitable distribution of the costs of providing a public good (i.e. a 
healthy forest ecosystem).  
Lack of access to social infrastructure intensifies the constraints posed by the 
gender division of labor, what Kabeer (2000, 2008) refers to as “gender-intensified 
constraints.” The burden of caring for children, which is primarily perceived as 
“women’s work”, may be mitigated with state intervention, i.e., the provision of adequate 
child and maternal care, and provision of well-functioning schools, among other things. 
The coefficient of the variable childcare, which measures the distance from place of 
residence to the nearest child care facility, and is positive and weakly statistically 
significant which suggests that as this distance increases, the amount of work burden also 
increases (also see Cavendish, 1999; Ilahi and Grimard, 2000).  
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Similarly, the coefficient for the dummy variable sanctuary, which measures 
whether the respondent lives within the sanctuary area, has a positive and weakly 
statistically significant effect on time burden of work. While one cannot claim that female 
respondents are the sole users of forests, decreased access associated with living in a 
sanctuary area might restrict opportunities for women. Women from Mandi district enjoy 
greater freedom and mobility compared to women elsewhere in northern India (PROBE 
Team, 1999), but they do not necessarily enjoy equal status and are also less able to 
access opportunities arising from higher market presence (GoHP, 2002). Household 
production, of which forests form a major component, offers them their primary source of 
productive work. Living in a sanctuary with its higher legal restrictions or at least the 
threat of conflict with Forest Department officials might not just restrict their mobility 
and their access to economic opportunities, but also imposes the need for higher time and 
effort levels in trying to find alternate sources of products extracted from their forests. 
Reduced access to social infrastructure and to forests thus increases work burden and 
thereby indirectly decreases a respondent’s ability to participate in community 
management.  
 
(c) Wealth Effects 
The variables, land and livestock, which respectively describe land and livestock 
holdings of households that respondents belong to, are wealth indicators. While land has 
a negative, weakly significant coefficient in specification (2), the coefficient for livestock 
is negative with weak statistical significance in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 4. The 
signs of their coefficients suggest that higher wealth is likely to lead to lower 
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participation in community forest management. This is contrary to results obtained by 
(Bardasi & Wodon, 2006; Lawson, 2007). In order to interpret the signs, it would be 
useful to direct attention to the degree of complementarity between the private production 
process and the forest commons. Households with high landholdings can substitute 
private land for commonly held forestland and thus may not engage in significant forest 
extraction (Balasubramanian and Selvaraj, 2003; Boyce, 2003; Cavendish, 2000; Fisher, 
2004; Jodha, 1995, 2001; Reddy and Chakravarthy, 1999). Fodder for livestock, 
fuelwood and other forms of biomass may be extracted from private land and used in the 
private production of agricultural products and the maintenance of livestock, two 
important economic activities in the study area. In other words, the degree of 
complementarity is low when land owned is high, thus decreasing contributions to 
maintenance of the forest resource, which would have yielded the forest products that 
rich land owners are uninterested in.  
High holdings of livestock also has a negative impact on participation; in this case 
though, it affects participation in monitoring and forest protection. Two differing reasons 
might explain this effect. First, those who hold a high stock of animals engage in 
traditional animal husbandry. Thus, it is possible that needs of their livestock are 
primarily met through transhumant grazing; forests close to their place of residence 
(which was the focus of this study) may not constitute a significant portion of inputs into 
livestock production. Second, forest policies in India view the utilization of forests as 
grazing grounds as undesirable and have actively worked toward its restriction and 
possible elimination. Thus, understandably livestock owners may be reluctant to 
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participate in community forestry initiated by forest officials especially in activities such 
as monitoring and forest protection which would reduce access to their forests.  
In any case, what is clear from the regression in Table 5 that higher land and 
livestock holdings do not represent a high opportunity cost of time; land holdings do not 
have any impact on work burdens and an increase livestock decreases the amount of time 
that an individual engages in work. Combining the results in both tables, it is clear that 
wealth is associated with lower incentives to participate owing to low degree of 
complementarity between private endowments and the forest commons or due to 
dominant discourses in forest policies that seek to exclude some forest users.  
 
 (d) Other Significant Factors 
The dummy variable, sanctuary, has a negative weakly significant effect on all 
participation variables except for meetings. This means that those respondents living 
within the sanctuary area are less likely to participate in community management. Living 
within the sanctuary is still fraught with reduced access to forests, increased surveillance 
by the Forest Department, and lower decision making abilities vis-à-vis forest 
communities living in non-sanctuary areas. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
the conflictual relationship between forest dwellers and the Forest Department in India 
(Guha, 1990; Sundar, Jeffrey and Thin, 2001). However, whereas in non-sanctuary areas, 
villagers were able to negotiate forest issues with the Forest Department on equal footing, 
in sanctuary villages, this was not observed. Further, the sanctuary area is rife with illegal 
timber extraction. The economic and political clout of the beneficiaries of the booming 
timber trade provide a disincentive or at least reduced capacity for villagers to maintain, 
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monitor or protect their forests. The positive effect of this variable suggests that 
respondents living within the sanctuary, spend more time working than those living 
outside of it, thereby pointing to the effect that access to forests have on work burdens. 
The indirect effect of this variable in increasing time burden magnifies its direct effect on 
participation in collective management.  
The caste variable has a positive and statistically significant impact on all forms 
of participation. It also has the largest marginal effect on participation. This variable is a 
dummy that takes the value one if a respondent belongs to the upper caste. The positive 
sign on the coefficient across regressions in Table 4 indicates that upper caste 
respondents are more likely to participate in collective management (also see Adhikari, 
2005; Adhikari and Lovett, 2006). Since upper castes are socially and numerically 
dominant in the study area, one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that socially 
homogenous communities are desirable for the provision of the collective good (e.g. 
Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Baland et al., 2007; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2007). 
However, there is insufficient evidence to support this claim in this study. The result 
merely implies that upper caste individuals are more inclined to participate and this might 
be due to the ease with which they can interact with other caste members. Given accounts 
of discrimination against lower caste individuals recounted during focus group interviews 
and casual interviews, it might also point to their exclusion from political and decision-
making processes. 
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4. Conclusion  
     In the past few decades, collective resource management has become part of the 
mainstream discourse in resource management. However, the issue of work burden of 
resource users and its impact on collective management has received little or no attention. 
This is unfortunate because it does not allow for a complete understanding of the full 
extent of the incentives, costs and abilities of resource users to participate in community 
activities. Time is an important yet limited resource. Understanding total amount of work 
engaged in rural livelihoods is useful from a policy perspective since it allows for 
understanding the relationship between time expended in rural livelihoods and collective 
forest management. Demands on an individual’s time, among other things, determine 
whether an individual participates in collective activities. This issue is of particular 
interest from a gender perspective since the extent of work time and the nature of work 
are governed by gender and other social norms. 
This article has four main findings. First, the results suggest that time burden of 
work indeed has a negative impact on participation; respondents with a heavy work 
burdens are unable to contribute their labor to collective management, even if they have 
the incentive to do so. Thus, heavy work burdens are an impediment to collective action 
with respect to forest commons. Second, it is known that in the Indian context women are 
discouraged from taking an active role in the public sphere, including in decision-making 
on issues that have an impact on their wellbeing. Forest management is no exception to 
this rule as Sarin (1995) and Agarwal (2010) argue. Additionally, because the cost of 
engaging in productive and reproductive work may be non-substitutable and binding (See 
Vickerey, 1977; Antonopolous and Memis, 2007), it may prevent women from 
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participating even if they have the incentive to do so. When women participate despite 
heavy work burdens, it is not in decision-making or administrative activities but in forest 
maintenance activities that requires significant labor effort. Whether this participation is 
voluntary, or motivated by the persuasion (or coercion) of family members, or forest 
officials, women are undertaking the triple burden of productive, reproductive and 
voluntary community work (Moser, 1993). Thus, women occupy a disadvantaged 
position and possibly experience a reduction in their wellbeing (Floro, 1995b; Floro and 
Pichetpongsa, 2010). At the same time, this triple burden leads to the provision and 
maintenance not only of the local commons but the global commons. Ignoring the work 
burdens of rural livelihoods, structured by social relations, only serves to ignore the 
inequitable distribution of costs and benefits of providing the public good and the 
inability of certain groups to participate in collective activities. 
            Third, higher levels of wealth are associated with lower participation in collective 
management. However, lower participation by wealthier respondents is not due to a high 
opportunity cost of time, since time worked decreases with an increase in wealth. Instead, 
higher wealth lowers the demand for forest products and thus decreases the economic 
interest in the upkeep of the forest commons. As a corollary, the demand for forest 
products is higher if wealth is low due to the precarious nature of the livelihoods of the 
rural poor in India (Cavendish, 2000; Fisher, 2004; Jodha, 1986; Reddy and Chakravarty, 
1999). Thus, it is essential to ensure that they are indeed well represented in forest-related 
decision making. Fourth, access to social infrastructure plays an important role in the 
livelihoods of resource users. A reduction in access to forests and childcare induces an 
increase in the expenditure of time and the costs of engaging in productive and 
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reproductive work. This has an indirect negative impact on participation in community 
activities. Ensuring adequate access to essential social infrastructure is relatively easier to 
remedy in policy terms. The provision of such access is not only beneficial to economic 
and social wellbeing, but benefits forest management and conservation. 
            It is important that the results of this paper be understood in the social and 
economic context in which work is subject to gender and other social norms, forests are 
used for “low-return” activities and do not require high capital inputs, and labor and land 
markets are thin. Additionally, capital and labor inputs in forest management are not 
substitutable; the Forest Department provides capital inputs and technical expertise and 
forest dwellers are expected to provide labor inputs. An important caveat of this study is 
that it does not incorporate the role of external institutions such as the Forest Department, 
non-governmental organizations and external aid agencies in its analysis; it also does not 
investigate the difference between voluntary contributions and those made as a result of 
implicit or explicit coercion. With these qualifications, the evidence suggests that factors 
affecting time use and time allocation within the household and the community are 
important to successful collective management of forests. Thus, it is insufficient to 
discuss participatory management as an ostensible pathway out of poverty without 
according due attention to gender and other social norms that operate within participatory 
institutions. 
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